
Our relationship with the Arab world is perhaps our most important and difficult foreign policy priority today. I believe this challenge provides a good illustration of how constructive engagement could work. Let’s make clear up front that it wouldn’t involve giving Arab governments and peoples everything they want or reversing all (or necessarily any) of the policies that offend them. It would involve instead identifying new opportunities for collaboration where our interests intersect, and operating to maximum capacity within that zone of commonality of interests. That’s the sweet spot of collaborative foreign policy.
In a certain sense it involves shifting the frame of reference for the relationship in a way that is more favorable or conducive to the achievement of U.S. policy objectives. Let’s look specifically at the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to illustrate how this approach might work in the real world. I assert that shifting the frame of this dispute – and America’s role in it – does not require us to side with the Palestinians on every critical point of contention with Israel. Instead, we would work together identify other things of value to the Palestinians (loans, development assistance, a vote at the UN, etc.) and help bring them to fruition. Over time the "frame" for the bilateral or multilateral relationship shifts to incorporate more of the collaborative (and perhaps less of the conflictual) areas of interaction.
The United States implemented this approach on a small scale with the French in the late 1990s, and with some success. In that relationship as much as in any other, we have a tendency to to allow all-or-nothing issues to dominate our consciousness on both sides of the Atlantic. Washington and Paris had reached a serious impasse over the strategic redesign of NATO. The Clinton administration had adopted the view that without French submission to U.S. will in NATO, we would refuse to cooperate with them elsewhere. The French were all too happy to oblige, mostly because they knew that without their support, NATO strategic reform was dead in the water. The same can be said of the pre-Iraq diplomacy in the UN in 2003. The Bush administration basically said, "Either you back us on invading Iraq, or we’re crossing you off the ‘ally’ list." Again, the French knew our chances for success in Iraq were severely diminished without broad UN and international endorsement (which was impossible without French agreement), and they were willing to take the gamble.
The potential Achilles heel of constructive engagement, however, is that when any party approaches diplomacy as a zero-sum game, everybody loses. That’s the potential risk to applying a model that worked with France to the Arab world. For the approach to work, it assumes that aggressive factions in the Arab world have or at least will develop an objective, non-ideological understanding of their interests. We have to trust that as the weaker partner they will not take a zero-sum approach. For example, we would have to expect that if we were offer the Palestinians a $20 billion dollar “loan” for infrastructure improvements and apply pressure on Israel to disband West Bank settlements, Hamas actually would stop sending missiles and suicide bombers into Israel. That makes this a phenomenally difficult strategy to pull off politically, because it will require unprecedented persistence in the face of outrageous violence that will take some time to get under control.
It won’t work at first, no question. The first year of constructive engagement in the Middle East would not likely result in less violence despite the more magnanimous approach by our side. The hope is that over time, the "enemy" is enticed by the benefits of further collaboration into modifying its behavior. The bottom line is that there is no other workable alternative. We all see where decades of aggressive and violent retribution by the Israelis has got them. The same can be said of our own "war" on terror. Are we safer? Can we hope that our bombs will result in fewer bombs from their side? I do not believe that is possible in the long run, despite the fact, as President Bush emphasized in his farewell address to the nation, that we have avoided another attack on American soil since 9-11. Clearly, we cannot ignore the threat in hopes that it will go away on its own. The ultimate question we face, however, is whether we have the courage to suffer short-term failure and loss in order to achieve long-term success.





